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THE LOGIC OF FORBIDDEN COLOURS1
Logic has no ontology, but logic is formal ontology.
Logical knowledge of reality is possible since logic deals with
formal, metaphysically unchanging features of reality. But what
does it mean exactly? How does our formal model of reality
depend on more or less sophisticated understanding of
logicality?
In this paper I discuss a classical problem of the relations between logic and
ontology, more precisely, between abstract logics and formal ontologies. I argue that
abstract logics may be considered as formal ontologies in the sense of Edmund
Husserl’s phenomenology. My proposal is based on the interpretation of the classes of
isomorphism as model-theoretic analogues of phenomenological abstract categorical
objects. What is gained, then, is a connection between model-theoretical and ontological
approaches to different types of formal relations (e.g. psychological relations by
Edmund Husserl, ideal relations by Alexius Meinong, internal relations by Ludwig
Wittgenstein, logical relations by Alfred Tarski, and metalogical relations by Nikolay
Vasiliev). I discuss some principles of the demarcation of the bounds of logic as formal
ontology, focusing on the question: “Are the criteria proposed by Husserl, Meinong,
Wittgenstein, Tarski, and Vasiliev necessary and sufficient for the demarcation of the
bounds of formal relations?” The case-study is the oppositional relations of colours.
Certain hues (for example, green and blue) can combine in experience into a
phenomenally composed colour. For a long time it has been accepted that no human
observer can have an experience of a colour that is for him phenomenally composed
of red and green (or yellow and blue) under normal circumstances. According to the
opponent-processing model of colours, not only we never see a reddish green or a
yellowish blue but rather it is in principle impossible to have an experience of these
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colours. Ludwig Wittgenstein claims that colours possess logical structures because
of their internal relations. As he says in ‘Remarks on Colour’, “Among the colours:
Kinship and Contrast. (And that is logic.)”2. Furthermore, Wittgenstein includes
into the scope of logic the proposition “there can be a bluish green but not a reddish
green”. However the necessity of this proposition has been recently challenged by
reports that ‘forbidden’ reddish green and yellowish blue colours can be perceived
under special artificial laboratory conditions3.
My main concern is to discuss whether these surprising results cast doubt on the
Wittgenstein’s thesis about the logical structure of colours. My aim is to interpret
these empirical results as evidence for game-theoretical semantics. To argue for this
advantage of the game-theoretical approach to the logic of colours I propose the
uniform game-theoretical model both for standard opponent perception of colours
and for its violations in neuropsychological experiments.
Abstract logics as formal ontologies
One of the attempts to demarcate the bounds of logic is a definition of abstract
logic in generalized model theory. An abstract logic consists of a collection of
structures closed under isomorphism, a collection of formal expressions, and a
relation of satisfaction between the two4. This definition does not include any
conditions concerning rules of inference. If we accept the principle “No logic
without inference” the term ‘model-theoretic language’ seems to be more
appropriate than the term ‘abstract logic’. My proposal is to interpret abstract logics
as formal ontologies, i.e. as genuine logics at least in phenomenological sense.
The interpretation of logic as formal ontology, i.e. an a priori science of objects
in general, goes back to Edmund Husserl. The project of formal ontology has been
planned by Husserl already in his ‘Logical Investigations’ (1901), but it has been
completely developed only in his later works, especially in ‘Ideas Pertaining to a
Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy’ (1913) and in
‘Formal and Transcendental Logic’ (1929).
According to Husserl, logic is two-sided. On the one hand, logic is formal apophan-
tic, the domain of judgment. On the other hand, it is formal ontology, the domain of
formal objects. Husserl believed that the transcendental justification of logic is possible
only if we postulate a special region of formal categorical objects. This region has to
save logic from the ‘specific relativism’ of Immanuel Kant who gave his interpretation
of logical structures in terms of universal human abilities. Husserl considered them as
structures of some objective area of abstract higher-level objects. What is the nature of
these objects? My suggestion is to consider classes (types) of isomorphism as
model-theoretic analogues of categorical objects of Husserl’s formal region.
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Any two isomorphic structures represent the same abstract system. We do not
know anything about an abstract system except the relations existing between its
objects in the system. At the same time, classes of isomorphism are abstract
individuals of higher order, i.e. hypostases of structurally invariant properties of
models. Thus, formal ontologies do not distinguish between specific individuals in
the domain, but they are not Kant’s ‘empty functions of unity’ since they deal with
individuals of higher order, i.e. classes of isomorphic structures.
Furthermore, classes of structures closed under isomorphism are generalized quan-
tifiers. À predicate represents a property. So the semantic value of a predicate is a subset
of the domain. A quantified expression has as semantic value a set of subsets of the
domain. So a quantifier can be considered as second – level property, property of
properties5. For example, Mostowski’s generalized quantifiers are interpreted by
classes of subsets of the universe and attribute cardinality properties to the extensions of
one-place first-level predicates. Mostowski’s infinite quantifier QM says that the exten-
sion of a suitable predicate has infinite cardinality QM = {X: X is infinite}. Mostowski’s
generalized quantifiers attribute second-order cardinality properties. More precisely, a
Mostowski’s quantifier is a function associating with every structure a family of subsets
of its universe closed under permutations of the universe. Thus, Mostowski’s quantifiers
perfectly satisfy the permutation invariance criterion by Alfred Tarski6.
Invariance criterion for logical notions
In his famous lecture ‘What are Logical Notions?’ (1966) Tarski proposed to
call a notion logical if and only if “it is invariant under all possible one-one
transformations of the world onto itself”7. According to Tarski-Sher’s criterion, it is
better to discuss ‘isomorphisms’ (or ‘bijections’) and “structures” instead of
‘permutations’ (or ‘transformations’) and the ‘world’. This criterion is historically
traced to Lindström’s generalization of Mostowski’s approach8.
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Felix Klein’s famous Erlangen Program (1872) proposed the classification of
various geometries according to invariants under suitable groups of transformations.
Klein suggested that each geometric field can be characterized by the invariance
condition satisfied by its notions. We can restrict or increase the transformations
taken into account, getting more specific or more general geometrical notions. For
example, affine geometry is more general than Euclidean geometry in the sense that
it can distinguish fewer objects (for example, all triangles are the same in affine
geometry), since its notions are invariant under more general group of
transformations. Permutation invariance takes all one-one transformations into
account and, as a result, according to Tarski, characterizes the most general notions.
For Tarski, the science which studies these notions is logic.
The idea that logic is characterized by an invariance condition, i.e. by the things
it does not distinguish between, has a long history. For Kant, for example, general
logic “treats of understanding without any regard to difference in the objects to
which the understanding may be directed”9. For Willard Quine, logic cannot assume
any special entities as existing ones. Thus if logic is supposed to be independent of
ontology, not only set theory but also second-order logic as ‘set theory in sheep’s
clothing’ go beyond the bounds of logic10.
If we interpret formality of a theory as its invariance under permutations of the
universe it means that the theory does notdistinguish between individual objects and
characterizes only those properties of model which do not depend on its nonstructural
transformations. Formal property should be preserved under the arbitrary switching of
individual objects. For instance, ‘red’ and ‘green’ are non-formal properties, since
they distinguish between things which are red and green.
However the standard argument in favor of invariance under permutation,
which relies on the generality of logic, may be challenged. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for
example, does not consider generality as a defining attribute of logicality: “The
mark of a logical proposition is not general validity…11 The general validity of logic
might be called essential, in contrast with the accidental general validity of such
propositions as ‘All men are mortal’”12. Yet, what kind of general validity is
essential and, as a result, logical for Wittgenstein?
The colour exclusion problem
According to ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ (1922), it is logically
impossible for two colours to be at one place at the same time. This is because of the
‘logical structure of colour’. As Wittgenstein pointed out, “Just as the only necessity
that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical
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impossibility13. <…> For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the
same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is
ruled out by the logical structure of colour (It is clear that the logical product of two
elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The
statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is
a contradiction.)”14.
Wittgenstein suggests that colour-ascriptions should be elementary. But, as the
concluding remark implies, they cannot be elementary. The point is that the colour
ascriptions are logically interdependent, and Wittgenstein tells us that elementary
propositions are independent. This is a well-known problem of colour exclusion.
In ‘Some Remarks on Logical Form’ (1929) Wittgenstein offered a solution to
this problem. Here he is interested in examining what he calls the ‘logical structure’
or the ‘logical form’ of the ‘phenomena’. He writes, “we can only arrive at a correct
analysis by, what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena
themselves, i.e., in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about a priori
possibilities”15. A color-incompatibility claim is a tautology and “does not express
experience”, however, being result of “logic investigation of the phenomena
themselves”, it is “in a certain sense a posteriori”. Wittgenstein said that a
proposition “reaches up to reality”, and by this he meant that “the forms of the
entities are contained in the form of the proposition which is about these entities. For
the sentence, together with the mode of projection which projects reality into the
sentence, determines the logical form of the entities”16. Finally, Wittgenstein came
to the conclusion that propositions such as ‘A is red’ should be seen as atomic, but
with numbers entering into their logical forms to reflect the degrees of quality
involved. If so, atomic propositions which attribute degrees to qualities should be
seen in the framework of systems of co-ordinates. He considered the geometry of
logical space of colour representation as an objective basis for the necessity of the
colour-incompatibility claims.
In a conversation recorded by Friedrich Waismann in 1929, Wittgenstein
remarks that statements about colour can be represented in geometrical terms by
assigning them a position along certain colour axes. He writes, “Every statement
about colours can be represented by means of such symbols. If we say that four
elementary colours would suffice, I call such symbols of equal status elements
of representation. These elements of representation are the ‘objects’”17. In
‘Philosophical Remarks’ (1930) Wittgenstein adapts Alois Höfler’s colour-octa-
hedron (1897) based on Ewald Hering’s opponent-processing model of colours18.
The basic colour pairs of this model, i.e. its elements of representation (red –
green, blue – yellow, white – black) are situated at opposite points of colour-octa-
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hedron axes. Thus, we can define ‘orange’, for instance, as what lies between red
and yellow. To say that something is orange, then, is to say that it has a colour
between red and yellow (possibly with a number reflecting the degree of the colour
involved). The degree of a colour is not its quantity. According to Wittgenstein, “If
I say in the ordinary sense that red and yellow make orange, I am not talking here
about a quantity of the components. And so, given an orange, I can’t say that yet
more red would have made it a redder orange”19. Wittgenstein proposed to
represent the colours by means of a double-cone. As he pointed out, “If we
represent the colours by means of a double-cone, instead of an octahedron, there
is only one between on the colour circle, and red appears on it between blue-red
and orange in the same sense as that in which bluered lies between blue and red.
And if in fact that is all there is to be said, then a representation by means of a
double-cone is adequate, or at least one using a double eight-sided pyramid is”20.
Wittgenstein’s double-cone represents the logical structure of colour. This is a
grammatical representation, not a psychological or physical one.
If our logic takes into account a spectrum of invariance which preserves
several additional structures, for example, a logical structure of colour space, we
may get various types of logical invariance. Johan van Benthem suggests that the
permutation invariance criterion may be viewed as “only one extreme in a
spectrum of invariance, involving various kinds of automorphisms on the
individual domain”21. Therefore, following Wittgenstein we turn back from
Tarski’s permutation invariance criterion to Klein’s original program. From the
point of view of Klein’s ideology, the logic of colours may be considered as a
member of a family of various logics of abstract objects whose notions are invariant
for one-one transformations which respect additional formal structures, in
particular, the formal relations of colours. The invariance criterion which is
generalized in this way is wide enough to include not only one extreme type of
invariance (i.e. permutation invariance), but a variety of invariances which respect
different types of ordering of the universe.
Yet, what kinds of abstract objects are formal? What does it mean to be a formal
abstract object? Gila Sher states that “Speaking in terms of objects we can say that
formal objects are not just elements of formal structures, they are themselves formal
structures”22. Logic takes certain general laws of formal structures and turns them
into general laws of reasoning.
Now the key question is the following: Why did Wittgenstein consider relations
between colours to be logical? My main concern is to clarify so cold Wittgenstein’s
‘puzzle proposition’ from ‘Remarks on Colour’ that “there can be a bluish green but
not a reddish green”.
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Wittgenstein’s ‘puzzle proposition’: meaning postulates
vs mapping functions
In his famous paper ‘Reds, Greens, and Logical Analysis’ Hilary Putnam
suggests that Wittgenstein’s ‘puzzle proposition’ is analytic, in the sense in which
‘analytic’ means ‘true on the basis of definitions plus logic’. He proposed to define
the second-level predicates “Red (F)” (for “F is a shade of red”) and “Grn (F)” (for
“F is a shade of green”). In defining these predicates we must be restricted, in
particular, by the postulate: “Nothing can be classified as both a shade of red and a
shade of green (i.e., “that shade of red” and “that shade of green” must never be used
as synonyms)”23. Putnam’s approach to color-incompatibility has gained
widespread acceptance among recent eminent writers on perception. As Larry
Hardin says in ‘Color for Philosophers’, “Perhaps not being red is part of the
concept of being green. Yet it seems that all a normal human being has to do to have
the concept of green is to experience green in an appropriately reflective manner”24.
Nevertheless, the introduction of certain meaning postulates seems to be
irrelevant to the exegesis of Wittgenstein’s ideas. The meaning postulates expand a
family of analytic truths by means of dictionary conventions. On the contrary, for
Wittgenstein, any attempt to explain truth of the colour incompatibility claims is
misguided, since the question of truth doesn’t make sense for rules of logical syntax.
As he pointed out in the so cold ‘Big Typescript’, “The proposition «at one place at
one time there is only room for one colour» is of course a masked proposition of
grammar. Its negation is not a contradiction; rather it speaks against a rule of our
accepted grammar. “Red and green don’t go together at the same place” does not
mean, they are never actually together, rather it means that it is nonsense to say that
they are at the same place at the same time and therefore also nonsense to say they
are never at the same place at the same time”25. Wittgenstein writes further in
‘Philosophical Remarks’, “Grammatical conventions cannot be justified by
describing what is represented. Any such description already presupposes the
grammatical rules. That is to say, if anything is to count as nonsense in the grammar
which is to be justified, then it cannot at the same time pass for sense in the grammar
of the propositions that justify it”26. To sum up, the meaning postulates deal with
lexicon, but internal relations of colours concern grammar.
Contrary to the meaning postulates approach, Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill
Hintikka proposed to represent the concept of colour “by a function c which maps
points in visual space into a color space. Then the respective logical forms of ‘this
patch is red’ and ‘this patch is green’ would be c(a) = r and c(a) = g, where r and g are
the two separate objects red and green, respectively. The logical incompatibility of
the two color ascriptions is then reflected according to Wittgensteinian principles by
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the fact that the colors red and green are represented by different names. And if so,
the two propositions are logically incompatible in the usual logical notation. Their
incompatibility is shown by their logical representation: a function cannot have two
different values for the same argument because of its ‘logical form’, i.e., because of
its logical type”27. For Wittgenstein, as Jaakko Hintikka tells us, “the conceptual
incompatibility of color terms can be turned into a logical truth simply by
conceptualizing the concept of color as a function mapping points in a visual space
into color space”28. Thus, “nonlogical analytical truths sometimes turn out to be
logical ones when their structure is analyzed properly”29.
My proposal is to generalize Hintikka’s approach on binary colours, e.g., on the
phenomenal structure of reddish green or bluish yellow experiences.
‘Forbidden’ binary colours: the opponent+processing
model vs. ‘stabilized+image’ experiments
We perceive many colours to be binary. Purple, for example, as a mixture of
blue and red. We may see bluish red, but it seems impossible to see a colour that
would be described as a ‘reddish green’ or a ‘bluish yellow’. Thus, certain
antagonistic pairs of colours seem not to be combined to form a binary colour.
According to the opponent-processing model of colours which goes back to Ewald
Hering (1892), there are different types of retinal photoreceptors with optimal
spectral sensitivity to specific wavelengths (e.g., short, middle or long wavelength
receptors). Signals from the cones are assumed to be combined in an opposing
fashion to produce opposing signals in retinal ganglion cells. This means that the
cells are excited by the presentation of a given colour and inhibited by presence of its
antagonist. Red-green and blue-yellow are supposed to be spectrally opposing
channels. Thus, it would be impossible for a human observer to perceive both red
and green (blue and yellow). The point is that it would presuppose the simultaneous
transmission of positive and negative signals in the same channel. As red cancels
green and blue cancels yellow, reddish green and bluish yellow are considered to be
‘forbidden’ binary colours by the opponent-processing model.
Perhaps one of the most surprising results in modern neuropsychological
literature on colour vision is the report that reddish green and yellowish blue colors
can be perceived in so cold ‘stabilized-image’ experiments. In order to see, the eye
needs contrast, which is provided by its very fast movements. If the eye totally lacks
contrast for a few seconds then the image will fade out. A stabilized image is an
image that is projected on a part of the visual field and which follows the movements
of the eye, so that the fading out of the image is restricted only to the stabilized
portion of the visual field. This can be done, for example, with special eyetracker. If
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an image is stabilized on a part of the retina for a certain time, thus producing a sort
of ‘informational hole’, then the brain tends to complete the image by so cold filling
in process using the information of the surround. In ‘stabilized-image’ experiments,
the subjects were presented with red and green (or blue and yellow) stripes on a
black field, such that the red and green stripes had a common border. The red-green
field was stabilized using an eyetracker. This was done in order to provoke a
filling-in process in which the information from the non-stabilized parts of the
image should be used.
In violation of the classical opponent-processing model, ‘stabilized-image’
experiments have shown that by stabilizing the retinal image between an
antagonistic pair of red/green or blue/yellow equiluminant fields the entire region
can be perceived simultaneously as both red and green (blue and yellow) or, to be
more precise, as a ‘forbidden’ mixture colour whose red and green (blue and yellow)
components were as clear as, for example, the green and blue components of aqua.
The first attempt at modeling these opponency violations by Hewitt Crane and
Thomas Piantanida was based on the hypothesis that there is an extra stage of
cortico-cortical rather then retinocortical visual processing, i.e. a non-opponent
filling-in mechanism30. I suggest that the game-theoretical approach allows us to
offer the uniform explanation both to standard opponent perception and to its
violations in ‘stabilized-image’ experiments.
The logic of colours in game+theoretical perspective
From the very beginning, the opponent-processing model of colours developed in
the game-theoretical framework. It suggested that the basis for colour sensations lies
in a process of winner-take-all competition between red and green (blue and yellow).
Now it is clear that this model must take into account the interactions between teams
of color-labeled cells. As Vincent Billock, Gerald Gleason and Brian Tsou write,
“Recent models of cortical color processing suggest that cortical color opponency
may not be based on hard-wired wavelength opponency within a single cell but rather
on (potentially fragile) interactions between cortical color-sensitive cells”31. They
assumed that the struggle between red- and green- (or blue- and yellow-) teams is
simply blocked by the border synergy of equilumininance and stabilization.
I suppose that there is no need to block the game processing since a variety of
game-theoretical independences provides important insights into the theory of
opponent-processing. In particular, the border synergy effect may be captured by the
game-theoretical notion of payoff independence.
Payoff independence logic (PI logic) has developed by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
and Gabriel Sandu32. They distinguish two types of independences in semantical
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games: informational independence, i.e. players’ ignorance concerning the choices
made in the game, and strategical independence that affect players’ strategic
decisions. Players may lack information concerning the structural meta-properties
of the game, including the strategies used in the game, the values of the players’
payoff functions, the number of agents in the opponent team or the size of one’s own
team, etc. PI logic is interested in the strategical independence. It goes back to John
Harsanyi’s pioneering work on games with incomplete information played by
‘Bayesian’ players33.
The main idea of my proposal is the interpretation of opponency violations as
payoff independence in ‘stabilized-image’ games between red/green or blue/yellow
teams of cortical color-sensitive cells. In winner-take-all games, the following
holds. If there is a winning strategy of the red team then there does not exist a
winning strategy of the green team, and vice versa. In ‘stabilized-image’ games the
information exchange between the opponent teams is blocked by the synergy of
equilumininance and stabilization on the cortical strategic meta-level. Consequen-
tly, both red and green (blue and yellow) teams have winning strategies in these
games. In other words, ‘stabilized-image’ games are over-defined. Thus, the law of
non-contradiction fails in the generalized logic of colours allowing the simultaneous
perception of antagonistic pairs of colours. In contrast to winner-take-all games,
‘stabilized-image’ games are non-strictly competitive.
To clarify the interpretation, let me borrow a fanny ‘chair analogy’ from ‘Some
Remarks on Logical Form’. For Wittgenstein, the proposition “Red and green don’t
go together at the same place at one time” is similar to the propositions “Brown and
Jones now sit in this chair". As he says, “For if the proposition contains the form of
an entity which it is about, then it is possible that two propositions should collide in
this very form. The propositions, “Brown now sits in this chair” and “Jones now sits
in this chair” each, in a sense, try to set their subject term on the chair. But the logical
product of these propositions will put them both there at once, and this leads to a
collision, a mutual exclusion of these terms”34.
Obviously, this ‘chair analogy’ gives rise to a worry. Wittgenstein seems to
speak here about physical, not about visual space. In my point of view, there is no
need to worry if we don’t consider grammatical rules to be empirical statements. As
Wittgenstein pointed out in ‘The Blue book’, “We don’t say that the man who tells us
he feels the visual image two inches behind the bridge of his nose is telling a lie or
talking nonsense. But we say that we don’t understand the meaning of such a phrase.
It combines well-known words, but combines them in a way we don’t yet
understand. The grammar of this phrase has yet to be explained to us”35. The
proposition “A is red and green” has no sense, because internal relations are
scaffolding for logical space. Internal relations exist in logical, that is, informational
space. So, if red team does not know that green team already has winning strategies,
it is logically possible that red and green go together at the same place at one time in
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the informational space. Brown and Jones can sit together in one chair if this chair is
a part of the logical space furniture.
On the other hand, the appeal to neuroscience seems to be unsuitable for the
interpretation of Wittgensteinian notion of ‘logical space’ since he clearly does not
think that the science, and particularly neuroscience, is relevant to the resolution of
philosophical problems. In a famous passage from ‘Philosophical Investigations’
§109 Wittgenstein stresses the distinction between his methods and those of
sciences: “It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones <…>
There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away
with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description
gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are,
of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the
workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those
workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not
by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of
language”36. Moreover, Wittgenstein considered psychological concepts to be
everyday concepts. As he says in ‘Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology’,
“Psychological concepts are just everyday concepts. They are not concepts newly
fashioned by science for its own purposes, as are the concepts of physics and
chemistry. Psychological concepts are related to those of the exact sciences as the
concepts of the science of medicine are to those of old women who spend their time
nursing the sick”37. According to Wittgenstein, nothing that science discovers will
affect the application of psychological concepts. Thus, neuropsychological data
cannot influence the geometry of our colour space. Furthermore, he claimed in
‘Remarks on Colour’, “But even if there were also people for whom it was natural to
use the expressions ‘reddish-green’ or ‘yellowish-blue’ in a consistent manner and
who perhaps also exhibit abilities which we lack, we would still not be forced to
recognize that they see colours which we do not see. There is, after all, no commonly
accepted criterion for what is a colour, unless it is one of our colours”38.
Wittgenstein put the question: “But can I describe the practice of people who have a
concept, e.g. ‘reddish-green’ that we don’t possess?” In any case I certainly can’t
teach this practice to anyone”39. If we ask: “Now to what extent is it a matter of logic
rather than psychology that someone can or cannot learn a game?” Wittgenstein
thinks it sufficient to reply: “The person who cannot play this game does not have
this concept”40. Speaking about ‘logical space’ we deal with logic rather than with
psychology. As Wittgenstein says, “When dealing with logic, ‘One cannot imagine
that’ means: one doesn’t know what one should imagine here”41.
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Wittgenstein 1958a. P. 47.
37
Wittgenstein 1980. P. 12.
38
Wittgenstein 1977. P. 4.
39
Ibid. P. 32.
40
Ibid. P. 31.
41
Ibid. P. 6.
I suppose however that some new neuropsychological experiments may
influence our language games, which, in turn, constitute what the colours are.
Howard Lovecraft showed in his famous novel ‘The Colour Out of Space’ how the
experience of the extra-cosmic colour which is impossible in human viewing may
destroy our ‘form of life’. In fact, our language-games with colours are historically
changeable; and neuropsychological experiments may contribute to our
phenomenal history of colours. It is possible, for example, that tomorrow the
invention of special glasses with a built-in eyetracker will make reddish green and
bluish yellow new common colours of our everyday ‘form of life’.
The imaginary logic of ‘forbidden’ colours
Furthermore, I suggest that PI logic of ‘forbidden’ colours may confirm Nikolay
Vasiliev’s project of imaginary logic. Vasiliev classified all judgments into
judgments on facts and judgments on concepts. He called the logic of concepts
‘imaginary’, taking the term from Lobachevski’s definition of his geometry. As
Aristotelian logic (like Euclidean geometry) concerns the real world, so Vasiliev’s
imaginary logic (like Lobachevski’s geometry) concerns imaginary worlds. Logical
structures are divided into the two levels: of metalogic, the level of necessary laws
which cannot be eliminated without distracting the logic itself, and of ontology,
which includes laws depending on some specific properties of the object
investigated. First level is connected with epistemological commitments and second
level depends on ontological commitments. According to Vasiliev, the universally
valid law of excluded self-contradiction, which tells us that ‘no proposition can be
simultaneously true and false’, belongs to the level of metalogic, but the law of
excluded contradiction, which Vasiliev formulated as ‘no object can have a
predicate which contradicts it’, belongs to the level of ontology and therefore its
validity depends on the characteristics of the objects being investigated. As Vasiliev
says, the law of excluded contradiction is empirical and real, i.e. it is the reduced
formula comprising the uncountable facts, like that red is incompatible with dark
blue, white, black, etc.; the silence is incompatible with noise, rest with movement,
etc.42.
Thus, we can reject the ‘empirical’ law of excluded contradiction, and, as a
result, the law of colour incompatibility, because the opposite is not unthinkable. For
Vasiliev, contradictions do not occur in the world of facts but only in the world of
concepts. However, if we would be able to perceive, for example, red and green
together at the same place at one time, we can reject the law of excluded
contradiction in our empirical world of facts. If we interpret the oppositional relation
of red and green as a kind of independent negation, the perception of reddish green
in ‘stabilized-image’ experiments gives us an empirical example of the violation of
empirical law of excluded contradiction.
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Ñì.: Âàñèëüåâ 1989. Ñ. 67.
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